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A SHOT IN THE ARM: LEGAL & SOCIAL 
OBSTACLES TO UNITED STATES 
NEEDLE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 
MARY ANN DEMPSEY* 
AIDS is now one of the 10 leading causes of death among 
one to four-year-olds and among 15 to 24-year-olds in the 
United States. In New York, it is the leading cause of death 
among men and women 20 to 49 years old. 
There is the expectation that parents will die before their 
children. Because of the HIV / AIDS epidemic, it is not 
working out that way for thousands of parents. They are 
watching their children die in the prime of life.! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 2 and 
has become the health care crisis of our generation. Based on the most 
current medical knowledge, every person who is HIV positive and 
develops AIDS will die. 3 This epidemic4 has brought with it many legal 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 GERALD J. STINE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: BIOLOGICAL, MEDICAL, SO-
CIAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES xxiv (1993). 
2 HIV is a viral agent which is transmitted from person to person through sexual contact, 
exchange of blood from blood products (including sharing needles containing contaminated 
blood), and from mother to child during pregnancy. Mark A.R. Kleiman, AIDS, Vice and Public 
Policy, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 315, 361 (1988); Linda M. Dorney, Culpable Conduct with 
Impunity: The Blood Industry and the FDA's Responsibility for the Spread of AIDS Through Blood 
Products, 13 J. PHARMACY & LAW, 129, 139 (1994); Larry Gostin, The Interconnected Epidemics of 
Drug Dependency and AIDS, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113, 116--17 (1991). 
3 STINE, supra note 1, at 35; H. William Goebert, Jr., Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), in LEGAL MEDICINE LEGAL DYNAMICS OF MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS 369 (1988). 
4 The Centers for Disease Control in 1996 produced a study in conjunction with the opening 
of the 11th International Conference on AIDS which estimated that from 650,000 to 900,000 
Americans have been infected with the HIV virus as of 1992. Michael Lasalandra, Study AIDS 
Spread Slowing in u.s., BOSTON HERALD, July 7,1996, at 13. It was noted in 1992 that the number 
of AIDS cases reported in the United States (approximately 235,000) was only an indication of 
the larger pandemic of HIV infection. STINE, supra note 1, at xxii, xxiv-xxv. An estimated over 
one million people in the U.S. are HIV infected and only approximately 30% know it, leaving 
over 700,000 people in the U.S. who are HIV infected and do not even know it. Id. 
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and social dilemmas which have created distinct battlelines among 
races, religions and politics.5 As the AIDS epidemic continues to surge 
through the United States with no cure in the immediate future, one 
geographic area in which AIDS is spreading rapidly is within the inner 
cities.6 This is a result of the high level of intravenous drug use which 
takes place in many urban areas.7 The United States has the greatest 
rate of HIV infection through intravenous drug use among the more 
than fifty countries that have reported HIV and AIDS statistics.s 
Many states, in an effort to curb the soaring rate of AIDS among 
intravenous drug users, have either enacted state programs or allowed 
for privately sponsored needle exchange programs within inner cities.9 
These programs encourage drug users to come to facilities and trade 
dirty needles for clean needles. lO Studies have shown that by providing 
such drug users with clean needles, programs are reducing the spread 
of AIDS through intravenous drug use. ll This can provide a bridge to 
the reduction and treatment of intravenous drug abuse and AIDS as a 
whole. 12 
Despite the apparent success in slowing down the rate of AIDS 
among intravenous drug users, needle exchange programs have had 
to confront many legal and social challenges.13 Needle exchange pro-
grams were established by AIDS activists who challenged various needle 
prescription laws. 14 Due to the difficulty for drug addicts to legally 
5 See infra part III (discussing the background of minority opposition); part lV (discussing 
political opposition to needle exchange programs). 
6 David L. Kirp & Ronald Bayer, The Politics, in DIMENSIONS OF HlV PREVENTION: NEEDLE 
EXCHANGE 78 (Jeff Stryker & Mark D. Smith eds., 1993). HlV among drug users is disproportion-
ately affecting the urban poor, blacks, and Hispanics. Gostin, supra note 2, at 116-17. 
7 See Gostin, supra note 2, at 116-17; Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 78. 
8 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 63. Statistics now show that the number of intravenous drug 
users diagnosed with AIDS exceeds the number of gay and bisexual men diagnosed with the 
disease. Dolores Kong, Mass AIDS Rate Triples That of '92 Cases Outstrip Projection, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 26, 1993, at 1. 
9 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417 § 21A-65 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
94C, § 27 (West 1995); Sandra D. Lane, A Brief History, in DIMENSIONS OF HlV PREVENTION: 
NEEDLE EXCHANGE 3-5 (Jeff Stryker & Mark D. Smith eds., 1993). 
10 See Lane, supra note 9, at 3-5. 
II Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, California 1995-1996 
Regular Session. A study in July 1996 reported that if needle exchange programs were available 
to injection drug users since 1987 there might have been 10,000 fewer AIDS transmissions in the 
United States. What We Don't Know . .. ,PORTLAND OREGONIAN,July 11,1996, at B6 [hereinafter 
What We Don't Know]. 
12 Gostin, supra note 2, at 153. 
13 See infra part III (discussing social opposition); part lV (discussing legal opposition to 
needle exchange programs). 
14 Lane, supra note 9, at 3. Most states, prior to the implementation of needle exchange 
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obtain needles, many began sharing needles which were often contami-
nated and resulted in the spread of a variety of diseases including 
AIDS.15 As of 1995, all but eight states have abolished their needle 
prescription laws. 16 
Many needle exchange programs established in inner cities have 
been targeted at minorities who are being disproportionately infected 
with HIVY However, despite the fact that states and AIDS activists are 
taking action to assist intravenous drug users and in particular, minori-
ties, opposition over the years to these programs has come from inner-
city minority political and religious leaders. IS Despite statistics and 
success of needle exchange programs in cities such as Tacoma, Wash-
ington, and New Haven, Connecticut, many black leaders believe two 
things: first, that needle exchange programs encourage and will in-
crease drug abuse within inner cities and second, that the specific 
impact of such programs upon blacks will be negative.19 Many view 
drug abuse as one of the main problems affecting the inner cities.20 
They believe that by implementing needle exchange programs, states 
are essentially conceding defeat on the war on drugs by condoning the 
distribution of needles to addicts.21 Furthermore, the opposition of 
many black leaders to needle exchange programs is based on the 
deep-rooted fear of AIDS and its impact upon the black population.22 
These beliefs have created a strong barrier to the implementation of 
needle exchange programs and provide viable opposition as activists 
programs, regularly enforced drug paraphernalia and drug prescription laws which prohibited 
the possession and sale of hypodermic needles or syringes without a prescription from physician 
and surgeon, dentist, veterinarian, or podiatrist. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417 § 21A-65 
(West 1995); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 38/22-50 (West 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-51 (West 
1995). 
15 See Jeff Stryker & Mark D. Smith, Executive Summary, in DIMENSIONS OF HN PREVENTION: 
NEEDLE EXCHANGE xiii Ueff Stryker & Mark D. Smith eds., 1993); Costin, supra note 2, at 122. 
16 The Needles & The Damage Done, CAL. LAw., Mar. 15, 1995, at 21 [hereinafter Needles]. 
17 Costin, supra note 2, at 117; Kong, supra note 8, at 1. 
18 See Stephen B. Thomas & Sandra Crouse Quinn, The Politics, in DIMENSIONS OF HN 
PREVENTION: NEEDLE EXCHANGE 110, 113-15 Ueff Stryker & Mark D. Smith ed., 1993). 
19 See id; Harlon L. Dalton, AIDS in Blackface, 118 DAEDALUS 205, 209-11 (1989). Dalton 
identifies five overlapping factors for why the black community is reluctant to acknowledge AIDS 
and forms of treatment such as needle exchange programs. Id. The factors are: (1) reluctance 
to acknowledge AIDS so long as blacks continue to be blamed for its initial spread, (2) a deep 
distrust of whites demonstrating a sudden concern for black well-being, (3) black homophobia, 
(4) the unique relationship between the black community and drug abuse, and (5) the deep 
resentment within the black community at being dictated to once again. Id. 
20 Dalton, supra note 19, at 217; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 114-16. 
21 Dalton, supra note 19, at 217; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 114-16. 
22 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 209-11, Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 116. 
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strive to change the legislation regarding needle prescriptions.23 How-
ever, black political opposition to needle exchanges has decreased over 
the years to the point where many black mayors in many major cities 
now endorse such programs in their cities.24 Furthermore, it appears 
that it may be political opposition by Republicans which hinders the 
funding and success of needle exchange programs more than minority 
opposition.25 
Part II of this note focuses on the necessity and the creation of 
needle exchange programs within the United States. Part III of the 
note focuses on the social roadblocks implemented by many black 
communities to prevent needle exchange programs from being estab-
lished, and whether this opposition is still a viable threat to these pro-
grams or, if the only opposition is now drawn along political party lines. 
Part IV of this note focuses on states that continue to have needle 
prescription laws and the legal challenges that continue to exist within 
the legislatures of these states.26 Some states with needle prescription 
laws have made exceptions for needle exchange programs run by the 
state or have established programs through emergency police power. 27 
Others, however, have had their legal challenges fought in the court-
room, usually by AIDS activists who purposefully get arrested in order 
to challenge the legislation.28 Activists continue to work towards chang-
ing the needle prescription laws in the eight states where they remain 
stringent.29 It is believed that clean needles are vital to reducing the 
23 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 209-11. An early 1990's study conducted by Stephen B. 
Thomas and Sandra Crouse Quinn of black church-goers found that only half of those surveyed 
trusts government reports on AIDS and that two-thirds entertain the possibility that AIDS is a 
form of genocide against the black race. David L. Kirp, Blood, Sweat, and Tears: the Tuskegee 
Experiment and the Era of AIDS, TIKKUN, May:June 1995, at 6. 
24 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 90. Support of needle exchange programs has come from 
black mayors in major cities such as New Haven, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. and New York 
City.Id. 
25 See CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL No. 547, 1995 Regular Session; Kirp & Bayer, supra note 
6, at 79,90-91; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 114-15. In 1990, Republican Senator 
Jesse Helms blocked federal funding of needle exchange programs. Thomas & Crouse Quinn, 
supra note 18, at 114-15. 
26 See infra part IV (discussing legal opposition to needle exchange programs). 
27 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417, § 21A-65 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
94C, § 27 (West 1995); Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
28 See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (1993); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d 507 
(1991). 
29 See Lane, supra note 9, at 3-4; Sean Murphy, 4 AIDS Activists Provoke Own Arrests; Group 
Gives Drug Addicts Clean Needles, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1994, at 19; Like Father, Like Son, In 
Chicago No Less; Battling the spread of HIV, Abbie Hoffman's Son Stands Trial far Participating in 
an illicit Needle Swap, NAT'L LAw JOURNAL, Dec. 12, 1994, at 1. 
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spread of AIDS among the drug addicted population, and activists have 
successfully employed the legal defense of necessity in New York to defY 
needle prescription laws.30 States, such as California, which still have 
prescription laws are controlled by Republican governors who oppose 
any changes in the statutes or funding for needle exchange progams.31 
As states grapple with these laws and dilemmas, the federal government 
does as well,32 Mter twelve years of a Republican run White House, 
which continuously denounced and refused to fund needle exchange 
programs, AIDS activists grew hopeful with the Clinton Administra-
tion. 33 However, it appears as though President Clinton may be reluc-
tant to support needle exchange programs due to fear of repercussions 
from a Republican backed Congress.34 Finally, Part V of this note 
addresses the dilemma of whether needle exchange programs can 
survive without federal funding and the support of black religious 
leaders and ultimately whether drugs and AIDS can simultaneously be 
fought within inner cities. 
II. AIDS, INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE AND THE GROWTH OF NEEDLE 
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 
A. The Rise of AIDS Among Intravenous Drug Users Within the United 
States 
1. Statistics 
It was reported as early as 1940 that intravenous drug users could 
spread infectious diseases to their needle-sharing partners and from 
these partners to women, men, and children.35 Needle sharing among 
intravenous drug users has resulted in the spread of many transmitta-
30 See Bordowitz. 588 N.YS.2d at 507. 
31 Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular Session; 
Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
32 42 U.S.C.A. ch. 6A, subch. XXIII, 300ee-s (West 1995). "None of the funds provided under 
this Act or an amendment made by this Act shall be used to provide individuals with hypodermic 
needles or syringes so that such individuals may use illegal drugs, unless the Surgeon General of 
the Public Health Service determines that a demonstration needle exchange program would be 
effective in reducing drug abuse and the risk that the public will become infected with the 
etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome." [d. 
33 See Doug Podolsky, A Lot of Talk and Also Some Action, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, Dec. 
18, 1995, at 1; Aid for AIDS, Clinton's Promise to Maintain Funding for Medical Care is Good News 
for New York, NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Aid for AIDS]. 
34 See Podolsky, supra note 33, at 1; Aid for AIDS, supra note 33, at 1. 
35 Gostin, supra note 2, at 115. 
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ble diseases such as bacterial endocarditis, syphilis, cellulitis, soft-tissue 
infection, and AIDS.36 Of all nations in the world reporting, the United 
States has the greatest problem of AIDS spread through intravenous 
drug use (IDU).37 It has been estimated in 1993 that approximately 1 
million to l.5 million people in the United States are intravenous drug 
users.38 Furthermore, intravenous drug users account for approximately 
one-third of the 250,000-350,000 cases of AIDS.39 HIV among intrave-
nous drug users is the main way AIDS is spread to non-risk groups.40 
The rise in AIDS through IDU is disproportionately affecting the 
urban poor, black and Latino communities.41 It has been stated that, 
"AIDS in America is a needle-born epidemic centered in predomi-
nately Mrican American and Latino ghettos that affects intravenous 
drug users, their sexual partners and their children. "42 Of reported 
AIDS cases in the United States population, blacks are contracting the 
disease in far greater numbers than their relative percentage in the 
United States population.43 
Among women with AIDS, 52.5% are black and among children 
with AIDS, 53% are black.44 AIDS has become the leading cause of 
death among black women in New York and New Jersey and approxi-
mately 55% of black women with AIDS have contracted the disease 
through IDU.45 In 1992, within the state of Massachusetts, IDU became 
the primary mode of HIV transmission for all newly diagnosed AIDS 
cases, moving ahead of male homosexual sex.46 Currently within the 
state, AIDS is the second leading cause of death for all blacks and 
Latinos.47 
36Id. at 117. 
37 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 63. 
38Id. 
39Id. 
40 Gostin, supra note 2, at 117. Most cases of AIDS reported among prostitutes are a result 
of intravenous drug use. Kleiman, supra note 2, at 361. 
41 Gostin, supra note 2, at 117; Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 78. 
42 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 78. 
43 Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 101. 
44Id. at 105. 
45Id. In 1996, women make up 19% of all AIDS cases, approximately 50% were exposed 
through drug use and approximately 40% through heterosexual sex (half with intravenous drug 
users). What We Don't Know, supra note 11, at B6. 
46 Dolores Kong, Needle Exchange Program Results Show Trend Toward Treatment, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1994, at 35. 
47Id. 
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2. Transmission of HIV through Intravenous Drug Use 
Transmission of HIV through needles occurs through the follow-
ing process.48 Drug users inject themselves with heroine, cocaine, am-
phetamines, or other drugs into a vein under the skin or into a muscle.49 
If the drug user is HIV positive50, and the needle they use may contain 
small amounts of HIV infected blood.51 The drug user will then, in 
order to insure they have fully injected the drug, draw their blood into 
the needle and then reinject it into their vein.52 The needle is later 
shared with another drug-dependent person who follows the same 
procedure.53 This results in the mixture of the former user's blood with 
that of the latter. 54 The entire process, which results in the mixture of 
blood among IDU's, is a highly efficient manner of transmitting the 
HIV virus.55 
In the past, intravenous drug users have used various unsuccessful 
methods to clean needles including: heating the cooker56 between 
shots to clean the needle of the HIV virus, and flushing the needle out 
with water, which is ineffective in decontaminating a needle of the 
virus. 57 Bleach is one method that can decontaminate a needle.58 Many 
needle exchange programs distribute bleach and demonstrate to drug 
users how to properly clean a needle with bleach.59 
Sharing needles has been described as a process of social bonding, 
a sign of mutual trust among addicts.60 It has been characterized as a 
ritual practiced between friends, lovers, and dealers.61 Studies have 
shown that new users average twenty injections before using their own 
48 Costin, supra note 2, at 115-16. 
49Id. This process is referred to as "skin popping." Id. 
50 HIV positive is the medical term connoting the presence of human immunodeficiency in 
the body. STINE, supra note 1, at 441. 
51Id. 
52Id. This process is referred to as "booting." Id. 
53Id. 
54 STINE, supra note 1, at 441. This process is referred to as sharing the "works." Id. at 182. 
The "works" is the syringe and needle used to inject the drugs. Id. 
55 Costin, supra note 2, at 116. 
56 Drugs in powdered form are usually placed in a bottle cap, or 'cooker' an item often found 
on streets or in garbage cans. STINE, supra note 1, at 182. 
57 Stryker & Smith, supra note 15, at xiii. 
58 Id. at xiv. 
59Id. 
60 See id. at xii. 
61Id. 
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equipment. 52 However, the main reason for sharing is not social bond-
ing but practical necessity.63 Most sharing occurs in "shooting galleries", 
places where drug users go to inject illicit drugs.64 Often customers of 
the "shooting galleries" lease needles which are called the "house 
works."65 Needles are used continuously among strangers, often until 
they become dull or break.66 The real crisis occurs within the "shooting 
galleries" where needles and often the HIV virus can be spread to users 
who have no knowledge of the medical backgrounds of the people who 
have used the needles before them.67 
B. History of Needle Exchange Programs Within the United States 
The existence of needle exchange programs only dates back ten 
years within the United States.68 As of March 1995, more than fifty-five 
United States cities have adopted needle exchange programs despite 
the fact that no federal funds have yet to be contributed.69 The first 
programs established in the United States were mainly underground 
programs initiated by AIDS activists such as John Parker.70 Parker is a 
former intraveous drug user who began distributing clean needles in 
New Haven and Boston while earning his Masters Degree in Public 
Health from Yale University.7! Parker, by distributing clean needles to 
addicts, challenged many state prescription laws through civil disobe-
dience. 72 
The first needle exchange program with community consensus 
was established in Tacoma, Washington in April 1988.73 The program 
was initiated by AIDS activist Dave Purchase and was initially privately 
funded. 74 Purchase was a drug counselor who bought the supplies 
himself and within a year had traded out over 19,000 needle packs.75 
62 Stryker & Smith, supra note 15, at xii. 
63 Gostin, supra note 2, at 121-22. 
64Id. 
65Id. 
66Id. 
67Id. at 123. 
68 See Lane, supra note 9, at 3. 
69 Aid for AIDS, supra note 33, at 1; Needles, supra note 16, at 23. 
70 Lane, supra note 9, at 3-5. Examples besides Parker include Dave Purchase in Tacoma, 
Washington and George Clark in San Francisco, California. Id. 
71Id. at 3. 
72 See id. 
73 Lane, supra note 9, at 4. 
74Id. 
75 STINE, supra note 1, at 207. 
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The program started with the knowledge of the mayor and public 
health officials.76 Since then, it has developed into the Point Defiance 
AIDS Project operating under contract with the local department of 
health. 77 
In November of 1988, the program Prevention Point was estab-
lished in San Francisco and run by volunteers who exchanged clean 
needles and bleach.78 The program, despite being against California 
state law, is allowed under the city's police power and serves hundreds 
of clients each week.79 
New York attempted its first needle exchange program in Novem-
ber 1988.80 Unlike the other programs initiated in the country, the New 
York program was a structured experimental program run by the 
health department.8 ! The program was located in health department 
headquarters, near a police department and court, rather than in the 
neighborhoods of its clients.82 Clients were required to obtain a photo 
ID and were required to enter into a drug treatment program when 
one became available.83 They also could only exchange one needle at 
a time.84 When Mayor David Dinkens took office in 1990, the program 
was abolished as a result of community opposition.8s Despite the fact 
that the program was abolished, the New York pilot program was 
successful while in operation.86 Two hundred and fifty people partici-
pated in the program (51 % of whom were already infected with HIV).87 
The program provided a bridge to treatment (78% of people in the 
program accepted a referral to treatment) .88 The program also pro-
vided clients with a number of vital connections to social services such 
as housing, primary health care, treatment for sexually transmitted 
diseases, and help with physical problems from drug abuse.89 Further-
more, upon entering the program, 82% of the clients reported sharing 
needles in a lifetime and 62% had shared needles within the past thirty 
76 Lane, supra note 9, at 4. 
77 Id. 
78Id. 
79 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4143 (West 1995); Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
80 Lane, supra note 9, at 5. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Id. 
85 Lane, supra note 9, at 5. 
86 Gostin, supra note 2, at 152. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
89Id. at 153. 
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days.90 Only 5% of these clients who revisited the exchange program 
reported sharing since their last visit.91 Finally, the program was suc-
cessful in exchanging needles; more than half of the 110 enrollees who 
returned for a second visit returned their needles.92 
In 1990, Hawaii became the first state to legalize a statewide 
syringe needle exchange program because of the alarming rate of 
AIDS among women and children.93 The program consists of a drug 
user coming to the treatment center and dropping a dirty needle in a 
bucket in exchange for a clean one with no names given or questions 
asked.94 Finally, the most successful and influential needle exchange 
program within the United States began on November 13, 1990 in New 
Haven, Connecticut by the Department of Health.95 There city workers 
travel in vans and exchange clean needles for dirty ones.96 They also 
distribute survival kits which consist of bottles of bleach, bottles of 
water, clean needles, and condoms.97 The program has proven that 
needle exchange dramatically slows the rate of infection without caus-
ing increased intravenous drug use.98 There are some indications that 
as a result of the program, referrals to drug treatment in New Haven 
have increased and crime has decreased by 20%.99 This program, most 
importantly, was influential in changing much negative political opin-
ion about needle exchange programs. 100 In New York City, for example, 
Mayor Dinkins tacitly approved of needle exchanges based upon the 
success of New Haven's programs despite having shut down New York's 
program in 1990.101 
Some major cities are still in the early stages of or have yet to 
establish needle exchange programs despite rampant IDU within their 
90Id. 
91 Gostin, supra note 2, at 153. 
92Id. 
93 STINE, supra note 1, at 208. 
94Id. 
95 Lane, supra note 9, at 7. 
96 Dick Thompson, Getting The Point in New Haven (Needle Exchange Program), TIME, May 
25, 1992, at 55. 
97Id. 
98Id. at 56. 
99Id. 
100 See Lane, supra note 9, at 7; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
101 See Lane, supra note 9, at 7. Similarly in 1991, Representative Charles Rangel of New York, 
formerly a vocal opponent of the New York program, sought a General Accounting Office study 
on the efficacy of needle exchange programs based on Connecticut's success. Thomas & Crouse 
Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
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urban areas. I02 For example, in Washington, D.C. the spread of AIDS 
is growing even faster than in most large United States cities.103 During 
the first nine months of 1994, AIDS was diagnosed in 226 heterosexual 
intravenous drug users within the District of Columbia alone.104 Wash-
ington, D.C. began a small experimental needle exchange program in 
1992.105 The program, which attracted less than 60 addicts, was widely 
considered ineffective. 106 Sacramento, California is also in the early 
stages of developing a viable needle exchange program.I07 In N ovem-
ber 1994, the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors approved by a 
one-vote margin, a needle exchange program under the county's po-
lice power to protect public health which is similar to how other 
California cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland 
enacted their programs. 108 
III. CHANGES IN THE OPPOSITION TO NEEDLE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Origins of Minority Opposition to Needle Exchange Programs 
Within Inner Cities 
Harlon L. Dalton, a black Associate Law Professor at Yale Univer-
sity and a member of the National Commission on AIDS believes that 
minority opposition is not merely directed to needle exchange pro-
grams.109 He states that minority opposition begins with the refusal to 
acknowledge that AIDS is a problem for the black race and, this refusal 
extends to a rejection of programs designed to treat and prevent 
AIDS. lID Thus, opposition to programs such as needle exchange by 
minorities is based on larger social concerns.Ill 
102 Amy Goldstein, Most New Cases of AIDS in DC Hit Drug Users, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1994, 
at AI; Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
103 Goldstein, supra note 102, at AI. 
IMId. 
105Id. at A2. 
106Id. 
107 Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
108Id. 
109 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 205, 209. 
lIO Id. 
III See id. at 211. 
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1. Difficulty Denying AIDS-Effects Upon the Black Community 
As AIDS continues to ravage our country, it is increasingly more 
difficult for black communities to claim AIDS is an epidemic that does 
not effect minority populations. ll2 As of January 1995, approximately 
84,568 young blacks were claimed victims of AIDS.ll3 Dalton, respond-
ing to statistics stated, "[U]nquestionably, AIDS has hit the black com-
munity hard. We are losing our sons and daughters at an alarming 
rate. "114 Dalton cited statistics which show that within many Eastern 
cities, blacks and Latinos make up the majority of AIDS cases. 115 In New 
York City, AIDS is the primary cause of death for black and Latino 
women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four and accounts 
for 84% of adult female cases. 116 AIDS is also affecting the very young 
in minority communities; nine out of ten children with AIDS in New 
York City are black or Latino.117 These statistics regarding AIDS among 
blacks and Latinos have forced minority communities to at least ac-
knowledge that AIDS is a real threat which must be dealt with in some 
capacity. lIS However, despite this realization, many minority communi-
ties initially voiced strong opposition to the establishment of needle 
exchange programs aimed at treating this epidemic. ll9 
2. Minority Opposition Encountered by Needle Exchange Programs 
When New York City introduced its pilot needle exchange pro-
gram minority groups articulated their opposition to such programs.120 
For example, religious opposition came in the form of Reverend Calvin 
O. Butts of the Abyssinian Baptist Church who came forward and 
112Id. at 209; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 106. "In an unprecedented event, 
the Harvard AIDS Institute, the National Minority AIDS Council and Harvard's W.E.B. DuBois 
Institute for Mro-American Research have scheduled what they call an emergency leadership 
summit on AIDS at Harvard. The Oct. 22 summit would mark the first time that elite African-
Americans have met over AIDS. Among the organizations represented on the steering committee 
are the National Urban League, the Children's Defense Fund, the NAACP, the National Basket-
ball Players Association and the National Clergy Advisory Committee." Derrick Z. Jackson, Black 
Indifference on AIDS, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1996, at A7. 
113 Hanna Rosin, The Homecoming Paranoia and Plague in Black America, NEW REpUBLIC, 
June 5, 1995, at 5. 
114Daiton, supra note 19, at 208. 
115Id. 
116Id. 
117Id. 
liB See Dalton, supra note 19, at 209; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 105-06. 
119 See Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 113-15. 
120Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 80-81,87; Rosin, supra note 113, at 6. 
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declared he was "not in favor of cooperating with evil. "121 This is 
insinuating the belief that giving clean needles would perpetuate drug 
addiction. 122 Another opponent to the New York program was the city's 
police commissioner Benjamin Ward. 123 He stated that as a black per-
son, he had "a particular sensitivity to doctors conducting experiments, 
and they too frequently seem to be conducted against blacks."124 The 
New York program was originally designed to be established in the 
inner city where it could reach minority clients but, due to pressure 
from black and Latino community leaders, the program was placed 
in a government building downtown and away from the targeted popu-
lation. 125 
Along with protesting its placement, the New York City Council, 
backed by support of black and Latino members, urged the cancella-
tion of the pilot program altogether.126 Then-mayor David Dinkins 
acquiesced to minority community pressure and closed the program 
within a year. 127 The caucus voted 31-0 to end the program.128 Caucus 
chair, Enoch Williams stated, "the city is sending the wrong message 
when it distributes free needles to drug addicts while we are trying to 
convince our children to say no to drugs. "129 
Similar opposition from minority leaders was met in other cities 
as they established their respective needle exchange programs.130 Rev-
erend Cleveland B. Sparrow vocalized his concern regarding Washing-
ton, D.C.'s program by saying, "[G]iving a needle to an addict is 
actually helping that person to kill [himself]. "131 Sparrow charged the 
work of needle exchange advocates as committing genocide upon the 
black race. 132 Dwight Clark who is director of Spectrum, an AIDS 
service organization, responded to the District of Columbia's needle 
exchange program by stating: "[W] e are just putting another Band-Aid 
on the problem through needle exchange. Get them off drugs-that's 
the way to lower the cases of infection among intravenous drug us-
121 Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
122 See id. 
123 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 80. 
124 Id. 
125Dalton, supra note 19, at 209. 
126 Id. 
127 Id; Lane, supra note 9, at 5. 
128Dalton, supra note 19, at 209. 
129 Id. 
130 See Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 113. 
131 Id. at 113-14. 
132 See id. 
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ers. "133 In Seattle, Washington, black minority leaders expressed their 
opposition to a needle exchange program which was honored by the 
city which waited three years before gaining the approval to establish 
a program in a predominantly black area. 134 
Unlike Seattle, where the concerns of minority leaders were lis-
tened to and considered, Dalton believes many programs ignore legiti-
mate concerns that minorities have about such programs.135 Dalton 
states that the concerns of minorities regarding AIDS, drugs, and 
needle exchange programs, if addressed and taken into account by 
state agencies, can be handled without the destruction of needle ex-
change programs in the process.136 He commented that New York City's 
Health Commissioner knew there was a concern that free needles 
could increase drug abuse. 137 Dalton believes the Commissioner de-
cided to proceed ignoring the concerns of the black community. 138 This 
resulted in the appearance of indifference or disrespect towards the 
needs of minorities. 139 
3. Difficulty Denying AIDS-Fear of Needle Exchange Programs 
Opposition to needle exchange programs arose due to some mi-
norities' belief that AIDS/needle exchange programs were part of a 
genocide campaign by white America.140 Another major fear was that 
minority supporters of such programs would be ostracized by their 
religious and social communities. 141 This exclusion from the church 
could occur due to it's opposition to needle exchange programs on 
the grounds that the underlying behavior which causes transmission 
of the HIV virus is in conflict with the teachings of many religions.142 
Also, many minority groups have strong religious beliefs and, some 
religious organization target their congregation to promote their poli-
cal agenda regarding issues such as AIDS.143 
133Id. at 114. 
134Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 91. 
135 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 222. Dalton notes that New York City's health commissioner 
did not disregard the concerns regarding needle exchange programs but concluded these 
concerns were minimal. Id. 
136 See id. at 207. 
137Id. at 222. 
138Id. 
139 !d. 
14{) Dalton, supra note 19, at 220; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 108. 
141 See Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 177; Rosin, supra note 113, at 6-7. 
142 See Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 117; Rosin, supra note 113, at 6-7. 
143 See Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 108; Rosin, supra note 113, at 4. 
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B. Genocide Theory 
Much has been written regarding minority opposition to AIDS and 
the term "genocide" is often used more for its incendiary effect. 144 
Professor Dalton argues that the use of the term genocide conjures 
thoughts of historical injustices against blacks such as slavery.145 How-
ever, there is much less literature addressing why black people use the 
term in relation to AIDS.146 
The term genocide is based on urban black resentment towards 
white AIDS activists who they believe have decided AIDS is a problem 
that must be addressed before drug abuse, illiteracy, homelessness and 
many other social and medical crises which plague inner city commu-
nities. 147 Dalton expresses the frustration of black America in the inner 
cities by stating: 
[W] hen we want your help, white America is nowhere to be 
found. When, however, you decide that we need help, you are 
there in a flash, solution in hand. You then seek to impose 
that solution on us, without seeking our views, hearing our 
experiences, or taking account of our needs and desires. We 
tell you that we fear genocide, and you quarrel with our use 
of the term.148 
The genocide theory is also based on the Tuskegee Study.149 A 
portion of the black population equate the Tuskegee Study with Nazi 
science, thus developing a deep mistrust in the American government 
and its public health policies. 150 The Tuskegee Study began in 1932 as 
a progressive study to combat syphilis in rural black men. 151 The United 
States Public Health Service established a syphilis clinic in Macon 
County, Alabama which was one of the poorest areas in the nation. 152 
The rate of syphilis among black males in Macon County, Alabama was 
an extremely high 36%.153 Due to a serious threat in funding, re-
144 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 220. 
145Dalton, supra note 19, at 220; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note IS, at 107. 
146 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 21. 
147Dalton, supra note 19, at 219; Kirp, supra note 23, at 6. 
148 Dalton, supra note 19, at 21S. 
149 See Kirp, supra note 23, at 2; Rosin, supra note 113, at 5; David Whitman, Working Magic 
in the Inner City, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Nov. IS, 1991, at S4. 
150 Kirp, supra note 23, at 2. 
151Id. at 4. 
152Id. at 2. 
153Id. 
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searchers proposed a study of untreated syphilis in the black male 
population hoping that the dramatic adverse effects of withholding 
treatment would result in more funding for the program.154 Many 
believe, despite there being no defense to the study, that the experi-
ment was based more in motives of science and money rather than on 
the notion of race or genocide.155 One of the most shocking aspects of 
the experiment was that researchers during World War II persuaded 
draft boards to exclude the men suffering from syphilis from service 
as medically unfit, as opposed to providing treatment for these men. 156 
The Tuskegee Study resulted in the death of at least 100 black men 
from complications resulting from syphilis. 157 
The Tuskegee Study, especially amongst some black Americans, 
represented genocide conducted by a U.S. Government in an effort to 
fulfill their ultimate plan of eliminating the black race. 15S Similarly, 
some blacks view AIDS as a plot to eliminate the black race. 159 A portion 
of the black population believes AIDS is a disease created in laborato-
ries and is being tested out on white homosexuals before being admin-
istered to its intended victims-the black race. 160 Many of these theo-
ries, which began as a result of Tuskegee, are reinforced through 
religious leaders echoing such sentiments.161 In a survey of black church-
goers, nearly half believed the United States Government was not 
revealing all the facts about AIDS and two-thirds were uncertain if the 
United States Government was responsible for performing genocide 
upon the black race.162 
This mistrust regarding AIDS and the United States Government 
has led to intense suspicion by the black population of any treatment 
of AIDS as well. 163 Many view drugs such as AZT as poison, condoms 
as population control measures, and needle exchange programs as 
encouraging minority drug abuse. 164 Tuskegee has thus taken on a far 
greater meaning than just an isolated experiment which exploited 
154Kirp. supra note 23, at 2. 
155 See id. 
156 Kirp, supra note 23, at 4. 
157Id. 
158Id. at 2. 
159Id. 
160 Karen Grigsby Bates, Is it Genocide? (Conspiracy Theory About AIDS and The Afro-American 
Community), ESSENCE, Sept. 1990, at 3; Kirp, supra note 23, at 2. 
161 Rosin, supra note 113, at 6. 
162Kirp, supra note 23, at 7. 
163Id. at 6. 
164 Id. 
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human life and resulted in tragedy.165 It is perhaps best summarized by 
Stephen Thomas, a professor at Emory University and conductor of 
the religious study: ''Tuskegee has taken on a life of its own as a disaster 
myth .... It has transcended being a historical event and turned into 
an urban legend, a personification of medical abuses and racism."166 
C. Religious Perpetuation of the Genocide Theory 
A great force in perpetuating the genocide theory has been the 
Nation of Islam, led by Louis Farrakhan.167 Farrakhan spreads his belief 
that the white race was created by accident, Jewish people are to blame 
for the majority of the world's problems, and that AIDS and drugs are 
being used by the government to eliminate the black race.168 In 1988, 
the Nation ofIslam voiced their position on AIDS and drew clear racial 
lines by distributing literature claiming AIDS was an attempt by white 
America to destroy black America.169 Besides being backed by the 
strong vocal leader Farrakhan, the Nation of Islam also has power 
within AIDS clinics throughout the country.170 One example is Dr. 
Abdul Alim Muhammed who runs the Abundant Life Clinic and is 
health minister for the Nation of Islam.l71 Mayor Marion Barry ap-
pointed Muhammed co-director of the AIDS transition team and the 
unofficial AIDS Czar of Washington, D.C.172 Muhammed has used his 
powerful position to preach that AIDS is a perfect genocidal weapon 
of whites against blacks and encourages the use of the experimental 
drug Kemron.173 
The Nation of Islam is not the only religious organization to 
spread the genocide theory among minorities.174 Some black church 
leaders assume the role of political activist within their congregation.175 
Since religious minority leaders are viewed as spokesmen within the 
inner cities, their promotion of genocide theories regarding AIDS and 
drugs preys on the fears among minorities and perpetuates paranoia 
165 See Rosin, supra note 113, at 5. 
1661d. 
167 See Brigitte Dusseau, Louis Farrakhan-Powerful Message; Controversial Messenger, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 2. 
168 ld. 
169Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 108. 
170Rosin, supra note 113, at 3. 
171 ld. at 3-4. 
1721d. 
1731d. 
174Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 117. 
1751d. 
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against the government, the white population as a whole, and any form 
of AIDS treatment. I76 Despite vehement opposition from religious lead-
ers regarding needle exchange programs, many have faced the grave 
reality of AIDS and have quieted their preaching of genocide within 
the inner cities.177 
D. Decline in Minority OPPosition to Needle Exchange Programs 
As inner cities continue to sustain the impact of AIDS, many 
religious and political leaders have been forced to reevaluate their 
initial positions of vehemently opposing needle exchange programs.178 
Many minority leaders view needle exchange programs as a necessary 
evil which must exist to combat AIDS.I79 Reverend Calvin O. Butts, III 
of the Abyssinian Church in Harlem condemned the experimental 
New York City program in 1989, but by 1991 had quieted his opposition 
and stated he would not oppose the distribution of clean needles. I80 
Similarly in Washington, D.C., Plymouth Congregational Church leader 
Ellis-Hagler who previously spoke to his congregation on the perpetu-
ation of addiction has relented in opposing needle exchange programs 
due to the lessening of community sentiment towards this theory.I81 He 
does, however, still view needle exchange programs as "a pitiful last 
resort, and racist. "182 
The attitude within most religions regarding AIDS as a whole has 
changed from ten years ago when ministers refused to preside over 
funerals of AIDS victims and funeral homes would refuse to bury 
them. I83 Today, as the number of victims within the inner cities in-
creases so does the understanding of church leaders that AIDS has no 
bias and spares no race or gender. I84 
Political opposition from minority leaders that was based on race 
has changed as well. 185 As New York City has become one of the hardest 
176 Rosin, supra note 113, at 6. Reverend Graylon Ellis-Hagler of the Plymouth Congrega-
tional Church in Washington once stated, "First, the white establishment pushes drugs into the 
community .... They cripple the community politically and economically with drugs. They send 
the males to jail. Then someone hands out needles to maintain the dependency." Id. 
177 See id; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
178Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115; Rosin, supra note 113, at 6. 
179 See Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
180 Id. 
181 Rosin, supra note 113, at 6. 
182Id. 
183Id. 
184 See id; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
185 See Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 90. 
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hit cities in terms of minorities with AIDS, the political sentiment has 
experienced a turnabout since its pilot program in 1989.186 Such changes 
culminated to the point where then Mayor David Dinkins changed his 
opposition to needle exchange programs. 187 Also, New York Demo-
cratic Representative Charles Rangel, who is Chairman of the House 
Narcotics Committee, relented in his opposition to needle exchange 
programs by seeking a study in 1991 on the efficacy of such pro-
grams. 18S Similarly, the endorsement of needle exchange programs 
over the years by black mayors in major urban cities such as New 
Haven, Philadelphia, Washington and New York has helped to relay 
the message to the black community that needle exchange programs 
are not genocidal. 1S9 
IV. LEGAL OPPOSITION TO NEEDLE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. Drug Paraphernalia Laws 
As of 1996, at least forty-five states and the District of Columbia 
have drug paraphernalia laws in existence, many of which are based 
on the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act created by the Drug Enforce-
mentAgency in 1979.190 Drug paraphernalia laws ban the manufacture, 
sale, distribution, or possession of any equipment intended for the 
injection of illegally controlled substances. 191 These laws include hypo-
dermic needles and syringes. 192 Drug paraphernalia laws require the 
element of criminal intent to supply or use the equipment for an 
unlawful purpose. 193 For example, it would not be illegal for a pharma-
cist to sell hypodermic needles for a lawful purpose such as treating 
diabetes. 194 Although these laws broadly cover manufacture, delivery, 
and possession, they are actually more narrowly tailored than earlier 
drug paraphernalia laws which did not require criminal intent and 
186Lane, supra note 9, at 5. 
187 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 88. 
188 Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
189Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 90. 
190 Lawrence Gostin, Law and Policy, in DIMENSIONS OF HIV PREVENTION: NEEDLE EXCHANGE 
38 (Jeff Stryker & Mark D. Smith eds., 1993); Needle Exchange: Bad Medicine, DETROIT NEWS, 
Aug. 8, 1996, at A14. 
191Id. 
192Id. 
193Gostin, supra note 2, at 135. 
194 !d. 
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even made acts such as distribution of needles to a diabetic for legiti-
mate purposes illegal. 195 
Despite the fact that drug paraphernalia laws were broadened by 
the early 1980's to require criminal intent, the federal government in 
1984 passed narrowing legislation which essentially made distribution 
and possession of drug paraphernalia a federal crime as well as a state 
crime. 196 In July 1984, Congress passed the Mail Order Drug Parapher-
nalia Control Act with the purpose to prevent drug equipment for 
i~ection from being sent through various states via the mail. 197 Similar 
to state statutes, the federal legislation had a broad definition of drug 
paraphernalia including, "any offer for sale and transportation in in-
terstate or foreign commerce."198 
1. Impact of Drug Paraphernalia Laws 
Having both state and federal legislation against drug addicts 
possessing their own needles has deterred drug addicts' use of clean 
needles. 199 Many states will not enforce drug paraphernalia laws but a 
drug addict could still be arrested and prosecuted under the federal 
statute.200 This creates a disincentive to possess needles for many ad-
dicts who would rather go to a shooting gallery and lease a dirty needle 
than be caught possessing their own needle.20l This further perpetuates 
the risk of shooting galleries for the transmittal of the HIV virus.202 
2. Proposals for Restructuring Drug Paraphernalia Laws 
One proposal to restructure drug paraphernalia laws seek to make 
possession of drug injection equipment legal, but the illicit sale or 
distribution illegal,203 This revision would serve a number of useful 
purposes.204 This proposal would allow drug addicts to participate in 
needle exchange programs and possess their own needles without fear 
195Id. at 134. 
196Gostin, supra note 190, at 39. 
197Id. 
198 21 U.S.C. § 857(a) (l984); Gostin, supra note 190, at 38. 
199Gostin, supra note 190, at 40. 
200 Id. 
201 See id. 
202Id. 
203Id. 
204Gostin, supra note 190, at 40. Gostin's proposal of focusing on illicit distribution would 
affect drug dealers or the proprietors of shooting galleries but not health care workers who 
distribute clean needles. Id. 
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ofprosecution.205 It would also allow statutes regarding illegal drug use 
and needle exchange programs to peacefully coexist. 206 Finally, it would 
limit the statutes so that they are directed at the real problem, the 
existence of shooting galleries and the illicit sale of needles on the 
streets.207 By limiting the language of the statutes to sale and distribu-
tion outside needle exchange programs, states, through legislation, can 
attack the places where most contamination of needles occurs.20S 
B. Needle Prescription Laws 
Needle prescription laws are more of an obstacle than drug para-
phanelia laws to needle exchange programs because they do not have 
the prerequisite of criminal intent.209 Such laws date back to the New 
York Boylan Act of 1914.210 Only eight states currently have needle 
prescription laws in existence.211 Ironically, within these eight states 
there have been a variety of methods taken to avoid the effects of 
needle prescription laws so that the question arises as to why these 
states continue to have such laws. 
The answer is two-fold: first, these laws have historically been 
utilized by states to implement the war on drugs. 212 Secondly, and quite 
sadly, this has become within both federal and state legislatures an issue 
where politics have taken over.213 Consequently, states, such as Califor-
nia, which have Republican control of government, much as within the 
federal government, face great opposition in reforming the laws and 
providing funding for needle exchange programs.214 
205 See id. at 41. 
206 See id. Restructuring laws to focus on illicit drug equipment distribution would further 
the trend toward institutionalization of needle exchange programs. See Gostin, supra note 190, 
at 41-2; Lane, supra note 9, at 8. 
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possessing a clean hypodermic needle would discourage the flow of clean hypodermic needles. 
This would encourage needle-sharing among those addicted to intravenous drugs and increase 
the spread of the HIV virus." 589 N.YS.2d 980, 983 (1992). 
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210 See id. at 41. 
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C. Status of the Law in States that Maintain Their Needle 
Prescription Laws 
Within states that still have laws which hinder the existence of 
needle exchange programs, there have been a number of innovative 
tactics taken by cities, local counties, legislatures, and the courts for 
the establishment of such programs to bypass laws whose only existence 
appears politically motivated. Some states such as Connecticut have 
fought the battle within their legislature to allow for exceptions to state 
needle exchange programs, while counties within California have cho-
sen to enforce their police power and declare state of emergencies due 
to the AIDS epidemic.215 Meanwhile, states such as New York and 
Massachusetts have seen this political battle regarding needle exchange 
programs unfold within their court systems with vastly different re-
sults.216 Regardless of the method, the eight remaining states have 
bypassed their laws and have established needle exchange programs 
leaving the issue of why such laws continue to exist within their respec-
tive states. 
1. Connecticut 
In 1990, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted legislation 
authorizing a demonstration needle exchange program in New Ha-
ven.2l7 Since that period, New Haven's effort has become a nationwide 
example of a successful needle exchange program.218 Changing the 
legislation to allow for the New Haven needle exchange program has 
not yet resulted in the abolition of needle prescription laws, but rather 
an exception to the law.219 However, recently proposed amendments to 
the legislation by Republicans in the Connecticut Congress could seri-
ously jeopardize the vitality of the program.220 
her own Advisory Council on AIDS recommended such a program. Kitta MacPherson, Statistics 
Suggest Needle Exchanges Could Prevent Many HIV Infections, STAR-LEDGER, July 10, 1996, at 1. 
215 See infra text accompanying notes 218-256 (discussing tactics taken within the states of 
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216 See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (1993); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 
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217 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 368A § 19A-124 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417 
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Despite Connecticut's needle prescription law, in 1990, the city of 
New Haven was a perfect location to conduct the experimental needle 
exchange program.221 The city had a population of 130,000 and was 
the seventh poorest in the United States.222 The community was 45% 
black, 15% Hispanic, and 40% white.223 The city had approximately 
2,000 heroin addicts which, taking into account the population differ-
ences, was roughly proportionate to that of New York City.224 
It was through the efforts of a group of public healthcare workers 
that Connecticut carved out an exception to the statute.225 The workers 
went into the community and spoke about the value of needle ex-
change programs at civic meetings, in classrooms, and in churches.226 
Mter garnering support from the community, politicians were forced 
to address this issue.227 
In 1990, the Connecticut General Assembly amended that statute 
regarding the sale of hypodermic needles and syringe restrictions.228 
The amendment allowed for hypodermic syringes in a quantity of ten 
or less to be sold without a prescription in certain instances, including 
a state needle exchange program in accord with Section 19a-124 of 
Connecticut General Laws.229 
In addition, the support of the New Haven police department was 
crucial to the success of the needle exchange program.230 Police Chief 
Nicholas Pastore created an environment which helped to ease the 
fears of drug addicts participating in the program.231 This tolerance by 
the police allowed for the enormous success of the New Haven Pro-
gram.232 Despite this success, Connecticut has yet to abolish its needle 
prescription law and in fact seems to be tightening its control over 
needle exchange programs.233 
221 Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note IS, at 56. 
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On January 19, 1995, Republican State Senator John R. Kissel, a 
member of the Committee for Public Health, introduced a bill which 
attempted to restrict Connecticut's existing needle exchange programs.234 
The purpose of the bill was" [t] 0 require anyone under age twenty-one 
to be in a drug rehabilitation program in order to participate in the 
needle exchange program. "235 This was similar to the restriction placed 
on the 1988 New York experimental program which was shut down in 
1990 by similar strict requirements.236 Moreover, it is at least one com-
mentator's belief that drug treatment restrictions hinder needle ex-
change programs and that addicts would feel more free to use a 
program if it came with no strings attached, such as forced treatment. 237 
The Connecticut amendment would significantly restrict the number 
and age group of addicts allowed in the needle exchange programs, 
which would prove a huge obstacle to the future success of such 
programs.238 
2. California 
California's needle prescription law states "no hypodermic needle 
or syringe shall be sold at retail except upon the prescription of a 
physician and surgeon, dentist, veterinarian or podiatrist."239 Unlike 
Connecticut, which created an exception to the statute itself, a number 
of California counties have established their needle exchange pro-
grams under county police powers. 240 In November 1994, the Sacra-
mento County Board of Supervisors, by a one-vote margin, approved 
a needle exchange program under the county's police power and the 
health officer's mandate to protect public health. 241 Cities such as 
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland have already enforced their 
county's police powers to avoid state needle prescription laws.242 In 
Sacramento, the program is already in jeopardy of being abolished due 
to political opposition from the District Attorney Jan Scully and Sheriff 
234Id. 
235Id. 
236 See Lane, supra note 9, at 5. 
237 See Gostin, supra note 2, at 160. 
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Glen Craig who are strongly backed by prosecutors and law enforce-
ment agents with similar negative sentiments towards needle exchange 
programs. 243 
In 1995, Los Angeles encountered problems with its needle ex-
change program after Mayor Richard Riordan declared a state of 
emergency.244 The County Board of Supervisors in Los Angeles began 
debates on whether to enact its own program but Los Angeles County 
Counsel, DeWitt Clinton, advised the Board in October that such a 
program "would violate state laws regulating the distribution and use 
of drug paraphernalia" and could potentially make the county "liable 
for damages to those harmed as a result of the program's operation."245 
Despite the number of counties exercising their police powers, 
Republican Governor Pete Wilson on three occasions has vetoed state 
legislation which would have abolished needle prescription laws within 
California.246 Democrat Kerri Mazzoni introduced the bill which would, 
among other things, give permission to localities to establish needle 
exchange programs while requiring the needle exchanges to be on a 
one-to-one basis, be part of a network of HN anonymous testing and 
early intervention, and attempt to obtain drug treatment for the par-
ticipants in the program upon their request.247 
The purpose of the bill is to slow the spread of HN by permitting 
the development of needle exchange programs.248 In his veto of the 
bills brought before him, Governor Wilson stated: 
AB 260 is a bill inspired by the most humane concern about 
what is conceded to be a grave public health hazard. But the 
inherent contradiction of all other efforts to prevent drug 
use-by formal sanction of a project which facilitates drug 
use-just poses an unacceptably high risk. Ironically, this bill 
poses a choice that is essentially an exercise in triage. I have 
not made lightly the decision to withhold my signature. I have 
243 [d. at 22. 
244 [d. 
245 Needles, supra note 16, at 22. 
246 2/15/94 Inside Report on AIDS, 1994 WI.. 3169449 (Page Unavailable On-line); Commit-
tee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular Session. 
247 Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular Session. 
The bill also proposed that the local health office develop operating procedures for the program 
which are subject to approval by the Department of Health and Human Services, develop 
community outreach programs which are culturally sensitive and linguistically appropriate, and 
most importantly, require the local health official to terminate a program if he or she determines 
that it increases drug use and spread of AIDS. [d. 
248 [d. 
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done so fully mindful that by some estimates there are as 
many as 400,000 active intravenous drug users in California 
are exposing themselves, their sexual partners and future 
children to HIV. 
Withholding my signature from this well-intended legisla-
tion is not an easy choice. But the choice I am compelled to 
make is for prevention of tomorrow's addicts, and the avoid-
ance of all the waste, heartbreak and tragedy that flow from 
drug-use. 
[0] f today's addicts, my choice is not to sanction illicit drug 
use through legalized needle exchange programs, but by ex-
panded education, preventions and treatment activities. My 
administration has committed itself to expanded treatment 
for drug abusers as well as to expanded education and pre-
vention activities to populations at highest risk for HIV / AIDS, 
including IV drug users.249 
Mazzoni cited statistics that within California injection drug users 
are also one of the fastest growing groups of AIDS cases.250 In 1992, the 
largest increase in reported AIDS cases in California was among injec-
tion drug users which rose 19% compared to an overall 4.3% in 
reported cases. 251 
In her bill proposed in February 1995, Mazzoni cited a landmark 
1994 study commissioned by the United States Congress.252 From this 
study, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences 
concluded that needle exchange programs are effective and proposed 
that the ban on federal funding for programs and research be lifted. 253 
She also noted that in 1995, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention concluded that needle exchange programs are efficacious, 
cost-effective, feasible in many urban areas, and easy to incorporate as 
one component in an overall drug use prevention and treatment 
program operated by local governments.254 
Despite the statistics and success of programs within California 
and the country nationwide, Governor Wilson has been a formidable 
249Id. 
250Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, California 1995-1996 
Regular Session. 
251Id. 
252Id. 
253Id. 
254Id. 
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opponent to any change in needle prescription laws and to needle 
exchange programs within the state of California.255 Despite Governor 
Wilson's political protest, as of July 1, 1996, counties within the state 
of California will be able to disperse part of the 17 million dollars in 
new state grant money to needle exchange programs with the condi-
tion that the funds are not used to directly purchase syringes.256 
3. Massachusetts 
The leading case which challenged needle prescription laws within 
the state of Massachusetts was Commonwealth v. Harry W Leno.257 In 
June 1991, the defendants, Harry W. Leno and Robert E. Ingalls were 
arrested and charged with 65 counts of unauthorized possession of 
hypodermic needles and 52 counts of unauthorized possession of syr-
inges.258 The defendant Leno told police, when arrested, that he was 
distributing clean needles for contaminated ones in order to prevent 
the spread of AIDS.259 In addition to the needles, police confiscated 
bleach and information regarding drug treatment centers and the 
hazards of sharing needles. 260 
The defendant Leno was a fifty-five year-old grandfather and for-
mer drug addict who has been in recovery for ten years.261 Leno 
learned of needle exchange programs through the National AIDS 
Brigade in 1990 and began his own needle exchange program in Lynn, 
MA.262 The other defendant, Robert Ingalls, assisted Leno in the pro-
gram due to his concern over the number of people dying of AIDS.263 
The defendants would legally purchase clean needles over the counter.264 
They were arrested for distributing these needles on June 19, 1991.265 
255 See Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, California 1995-1996 
Regular Session; 2/15/94 Inside Report on AIDS, 1994 WL 3169449 (Page Unavailable On-Line). 
256 Barry Witt, Needle Exhange Programs May Try Ta Use State Funds, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 
26, 1996, at N24. 
257 See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (1993). 
258 [d. at 454. On February 23, 1996, Democratic Senator Diane E. Watson proposed legisla-
tion which would amend Section 4146 of the Business & Professions Code and to allow for pilot 
needle exchange programs within California. California Senate Bill No. 1976, California 1995-
1996 Regular Session. 
259 Lena, 616 N.E.2d at 454. 
260 [d. at 454 n.4. 
261 [d. 
262 [d. 
263 [d. 
264 Lena, 616 N.E.2d at 454. 
265 [d. 
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Prior to their arrest, defendants could be found in the same location 
every Wednesday distributing clean needles and information packets 
regarding AIDS and drug treatment for addicts.266 They exchanged 
between 150 to 200 needles each night, for fifty to sixty people.267 
In their defense of necessity,268 the defendants offered expert 
testimony at the triaI.269 Dr. Ernest Drucker, an authority on the rela-
tionship between treatment of drug users and the transmittal of AIDS 
testified that "[s]tudies of needle exchange programs revealed no 
evidence that such programs cause people who are not drug addicts 
to become addicts, but that evidence indicates that needle exchange 
programs bring some addicts into drug and AIDS treatment programs 
who would not otherwise be there .... "270 The defendants also pre-
sented other experts.27! Elaine O'Keefe, director of the AIDS Division 
of the New Haven, Connecticut Health Department testified to similar 
findings regarding needle exchange programs and AIDS.272 Kathleen 
Gallagher, director of the AIDS surveillance program of the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Health, testified to the severity of the AIDS 
epidemic in Massachusetts and elsewhere.273 The Supreme Judicial 
Court's decision affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the defen-
dants' request for the jury instruction of necessity.274 The court stated, 
"[T] he defendants do not deny that they violated the provisions of the 
statutes restricting the possession and distribution of hypodermic nee-
dles; rather, they contend that the judge's refusal to instruct the jury 
on the defense of necessity was error. We disagree. "275 The court stated 
that it has emphasized that a person asserting the necessity defense 
must, "demonstrate that the danger motivating his or her unlawful 
conduct is imminent and that he or she acted out of necessity at all 
times that he or she engaged in the unlawful conduct. "276 
266Id. 
267Id. at 454-55. 
268The necessity defense evolved under common law and varies among jurisdictions. Gostin, 
supra note 190, at 53. It is founded on the theory that conduct that would otherwise constitute 
a criminal offense is justified in extraordinary circumstances such as conduct necessary to avoid 
an imminent harm to a person or to the public. Id. Other circumstances include incidents 
where the defendant entertained a good-faith belief that the act was necessary to prevent a greater 
harm.Id. 
269 Lena, 616 N.E.2d at 455. 
27°Id. 
271Id. 
272 Id. 
273Id. 
274 Lena, 616 N.E.2d at 455. 
275Id. 
276Id. at 456. 
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The court decided that any changes in the necessity defense must 
be made by the legislature and not the courts.277 The court concluded 
that "the defendants did not show that the danger they sought to avoid 
was clear and imminent, rather than debatable or speculative," and 
that whether the current needle prescription law was wise or effective 
is to be decided by the legislature and not the courtS.278 Citing the case 
of Commonwealth v. Lammi,279 the court stated, "Our deference to 
legislative judgments reflects neither an abdication of nor unwilling-
ness to perform the judicial role; but rather a recognition of the 
separation of powers and the undesirability of the judiciary substituting 
its notion of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legisla-
ture."280 
Since the court's decision, the Massachusetts Legislature passed 
an exception to the needle prescription law by adding to section 27: 
(f) Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, 
needles and syringes may be distributed or possessed as part 
of a pilot program approved by the department of public 
health in accordance with section two hundred and fifteen of 
chapter one hundred and eleven and any such distribution 
or exchange of said needles or syringes shall not be a crime.281 
Also similar to the proposed Republican bill in the Connecticut 
Legislature, the Massachusetts statute already contains a clause stating, 
"[T]he Department of public health shall ensure that individuals par-
ticipating in a pilot needle exchange program will be encouraged to 
seek and will be placed in contact with substance abuse treatment and 
health care. "282 
The first results of the Massachusetts needle exchange pilot pro-
gram indicated that 13% of 1,200 intravenous drug users taking part 
started treatment for their addiction. 283 David Mulligan, who is the 
public health commissioner for Massachusetts, has been encouraged 
by the results of the pilot program and has stated that there will be 
future proposals sent to the Massachusetts Legislature regarding either 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 456-57. 
279 Lammi, 435 N.E.2d 360 (1992). While deciding that an ordinance for possessing an 
exposed bottle of whiskey on a public street was not facially unconstitutional, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts stated that whether an ordinance is wise or effective is not within the 
province of the Supreme Judicial Court. Id. 
280 Id. 
281 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 94C, § 27 (West 1995). 
282 Id; see CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL No. 547, 1995 Regular Session. 
283 Kong, supra note 46, at 35. 
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the expansion of supervised needle exchange programs or the elimi-
nation of needle sales throughout the state.284 However, despite the 
pilot program, AIDS activists still lobby for the allowance of private 
needle exchange programs such as the National AIDS Brigade led by 
famous AIDS activist John Stuen-Parker.285 In February of 1994, ap-
proximately 30 AIDS activists lobbied outside Boston Mayor Thomas 
Menino's office in an attempt to have the mayor adopt a "no arrest 
policy" toward activists who conduct unsanctioned needle exchange 
programs in Boston's neighborhoods.286 The mayor refused to meet 
with the activists.287 Stuen-Parker has not been deterred by court deci-
sions and the legislature's refusal to change and has vowed to organize 
needle exchanges every Friday morning at the same location.288 Stuen-
Parker believes the Brigade sponsored program should be allowed to 
operate alongside the official one and has vowed, 'We're not going to 
stop until the law changes. "289 
4. New York 
In New York, unlike Massachusetts, AIDS activists have achieved 
success in using the court system to bypass the state's needle prescrip-
tion laws in People v. Bordowitz.290 The defendants, including AIDS 
activists Greg Bordowitz and John Stuen-Parker, were arrested March 
6, 1990 after police learned from a Newsday article where defendants 
planned to distribute needles.291 The defendants claimed their actions 
were justified, due to the exigency created by the AIDS epidemic, and 
therefore would satisfy the defense of necessity.292 The criminal court 
in New York stated that the New York statute provides that the necessity 
284Id. at 36. 
285Murphy, supra note 29, at 19. 
286Id. 
287Id. 
288Id. 
289Id. In the New Jersey case State v. Sorge (including defendant Stuen-Parker), the Superior 
Court concluded, "Defendants, albeit for the highest motives, were engaged in facilitating illegal 
drug use. Whatever social benefits may have attended defendants' plan in terms of minimizing 
the transmission of HIV in the community, defendants were exacerbating the social costs associ-
ated with the illegal drug trade." 591 A.2d 1382, 1385 (1991). On June 5,1996, Stuen-Parker and 
Daniel Sundquist were found guilty of illegally possessing hypodermic needles and received 
suspended sentences in the state of New Hampshire where it is against the law to possess a syringe 
without a prescription. 2 Convicted For Needle Programs, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 1996 at 36. 
290 See People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507, 512 (1991). 
291Id. at 508. 
292Id. 
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defense cannot rest only upon moral considerations and advisability of 
the statute.293 However, its application to preserve the physical well-be-
ing of an individual or group of individuals has long since been rec-
ognized.294 
The court stated that based on defendants' expert testimony, 
"[t]his court finds it was reasonable for the defendants to believe their 
action was necessary as an emergency measure to avert an imminent 
public injury. "295 The court took judicial notice that there are differing 
political views, however they focused on whether the defendants' ac-
tions in this case were reasonable. 296 The court stated that" [w] hile the 
defendants' actions alone would not end the epidemic, it is reasonable 
to believe their actions served to avert further risks of infection for 
some individuals. This court is satisfied that the nature of the crisis 
facing this City, coupled with the medical evidence offered, warranted 
defendants' action."297 
In contrast to Massachusetts, which left the issue to the legislature, 
the New York court stated: 
No legislative or executive action precludes the necessity de-
fense in this case. The hypodermic possession statute and the 
related public health law provision were enacted to fight drug 
usage well before the onset of the AIDS crisis. The state 
legislature has yet to consider whether to revise the hypoder-
mic possession statute in the wake of the epidemic. Although 
efforts to repeal or amend the law have not been successful, 
without a specific vote based on consideration of the AIDS 
epidemic, this court cannot find legislative action to have 
precluded the defense in this case.298 
The court went on to conclude that defendants' defense of neces-
sity would be allowed. 299 The court reasoned "by violating the substan-
tive crime of criminally possessing a hypodermic needle, the defen-
dants directly advanced their purpose of providing clean needles to 
addicts to help avert further HIV infections. This court is satisfied that 
293Id. at 510. 
294Id. at 509. 
295 Bordowitz, 588 N .YS.2d at 511. 
296Id. 
297Id. 
298Id. at 512. 
299Id. at 513. 
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defendants' conduct was not one of mere protest against a statute but 
was intended to help avert a very real emergency."300 
D. Status of Needle Exchange Programs at the Federal Level 
Needle exchange programs have perhaps faced their greatest ob-
stacle to funding and acceptance in the executive and legislative branches 
of our federal government. 301 Under the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions, needle exchange programs were rejected. 302 It was viewed that 
tolerance of such programs would undercut the zero tolerance drug 
campaign which was put forth by both presidents.303 In 1992, White 
House Drug Czar Robert Martinez reiterated the sentiments within 
the executive branch that needle exchange programs encourage drug 
use.304 Furthermore, Martinez stated that needle exchange programs 
send society the wrong message by condoning drug use rather than 
depicting drugs as illegal and morally wrong.305 
Congress also expressed opposition during this period, led by the 
charge of Republican Senator Jesse Helms.306 Since 1988, Congress has 
successfully passed a series of statutes which restrict funding to needle 
exchange programs.307 Congress passed section 300ee-s of the Public 
Health and Welfare Act which states: 
None of the funds provided under this Act or an amendment 
made by this Act shall be used to provide individuals with 
hypodermic needles or syringes so that such individuals may 
use illegal drugs, unless the Surgeon General of the Public 
Health Service determines that a demonstration needle ex-
change program would be effective in reducing drug abuse 
and the risk that the public will become infected with the 
etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome.30s 
300 Bordowitz, 588 N'yS.2d. at 513. 
301 See 42 U.S.CA Ch. 6A, subch. XXIII, § 300ee-s (West 1995); Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, 
at 79. 
302 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 79. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 79-80. 
305 Id. 
306 See Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 80; Newswatch, PANTAGRAPH, Sept. 20, 1995, at 2; Julie 
Rovner, Appmpriations: Senate Resists Adding Money to Popular Social Programs, CONGo QUARTERLY 
WKLY. REp., Sept. 19, 1992, at 3. 
307 Victor Hall, Panel Supports Needle Exchanges to Curb AIDS, COM. APPEAL Sept. 20, 
1995, at 1. 
308 42 U.S.CA ch. 6A, subch. XXIII, § 300ee-s (West 1995). 
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In 1992, Congress tried to reorganize the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, 
Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) .309 Martinez once again lob-
bied within both the Senate and House preventing this because it 
included a provision which would lift the four-year ban on federal 
funding for needle exchange programs.310 Speaking before the House 
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations 
of the Committee on Governmental Regulations regarding AIDS and 
the black Community, Ronald Johnson, a Citywide Coordinator for 
AIDS Policy for the city of New York, expressed frustration from the 
lack of federal assistance by stating: 
Our people and our communities have paid the price of 13 
years of virtual neglect from the national leadership that has 
trickled down to state and local governments. We cannot 
afford any further neglect. All levels of government must be 
involved rather than on the sidelines. African American elected 
officials, including legislators must be engaged fully in pro-
viding leadership to and involvement in the fight against 
AIDS.311 
Two events occurred which indicated that the federal government 
would join the fight for needle exchange programs: first, the 1992 
election of Democratic President Bill Clinton who declared his com-
mitment to fighting AIDS; secondly was two monumental studies within 
a year of each other by the University of California and the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC).312 
When President Clinton entered office it was the first sign of the 
White House opening its doors to the needs of AIDS activists.313 Praised 
for what former Presidents Reagan and Bush would never do, Presi-
dent Clinton hosted the first White House Conference on AIDS and 
HIV.314 President Clinton declared to over 300 AIDS activists that the 
United States can conquer AIDS; however, President Clinton never 
309 ADAMHA Bill Slated Again, HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. WKLY., June 3, 1992 [hereinafter 
ADAMHA]. 
310 Id. 
311 Ronald Johnson, AIDS and HN Infection in The African American Community, 1994 WL 
510330 (F.D.C.H.), at 6. 
312 See Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular 
Session; Representative Jay H.S. Coburn, Preventing HN Infection and Preventing AIDS, 1994 WL 
361733 (F.D.C.H.), at 7; Podolski, supra note 33, at 1. 
313 See Podolski, supra note 33, at 1. 
314Id. 
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committed himself to a national needle exchange program or to fed-
eral funding for the state programs in existence.315 
The fact that President Clinton never directly committed himself 
to supporting needle exchange can be attributed to the forthcom-
ing opposition from a Republican Congress and in particular Jesse 
Helms.316 However, Congress' prohibitions on funding appeared con-
ditional, and if needle exchange programs could be proven to both 
reduce the spread of AIDS and cause no increase in drug abuse, it 
appeared, based on the wording of the statute, that Congress would 
lift the ban.317 In 1993, the Institute for Health Policy Studies at the 
University of California at San Francisco produced a study, conducted 
by Dr. Peter Lurie, which found that needle exchange programs re-
duced needle sharing among addicts.318 The study went on to conclude 
that there was no evidence that needle exchange programs increased 
drug use.319 Representative Coburn, in presenting the study, stated that 
needle exchange programs were a valuable first link to drug treatment 
for many addicts.320 The study recommended that federal restrictions 
on funding for needle exchange programs be lifted.321 
In addition to this study, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
issued a report which advocated federal funding of such programs.322 
Despite the backing by the CDC, the Clinton administration continues 
to claim the evidence is not strong enough to support needle exchange 
programs.323 Dr. Lurie believes the Clinton administration is ignoring 
the results of the studies and backing down in fear of a Republican 
dominated Congress.324 Dr. Lurie perhaps best describes Congress' and 
the President's refusal to acknowledge and accept the finding of the 
studies by stating, "I cannot think of another example where the 
federal government denied people at great risk of HIV a potentially 
life-saving intervention. This outstrips all previous government miscon-
duct on this issue. This has nothing to do with science. It's politics, 
pure and simple."325 
315 See id; Russell, supra note 213, at 1; Aid far AIDS, supra note 33, at l. 
316Russell, supra note 213, at 2; Aid far AIDS, supra note 33, at l. 
317 See 42 U.S.CA. Ch. 6A, subch. XXIII, § 300ee-s (West 1995); Russell, supra note 213, at 2. 
3lBCoburn, supra note 312, at 7. 
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321 Russell, supra note 213, at 2. 
322Coburn, supra note 312, at 6; Russell, supra note 213, at l. 
323 Coburn, supra note 312, at 6; Russell, supra note 213, at l. 
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V. THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF NEEDLE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AT 
THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS 
A. State Level: Legislatures v. Courts 
65 
At the state level, in the states that continue to have needle pre-
scription laws, the legislatures and the courts continue to shift respon-
sibility in addressing necessary components of such programs.326 Over-
all, it appears that the courts may be where needle exchange programs 
can find their greatest ally;327 while on the other hand, it appears that 
the state legislatures continue to be a formidable obstacle which needle 
exchange programs are forced to hurdle. 328 
1. Legislative Tendencies 
The future of needle exchange programs appears uncertain par-
ticularly in the eight state legislatures that continue to have needle 
prescription laws.329 This is due to tight legislative control over the 
structure and funding of state needle exchange programs.330 Due to 
the inability within states to abolish needle prescription laws, it appears 
the battle may be better waged in the courts than in the state legisla-
tures. 331 Also, within the remaining states, Republican Governors have 
proven to be formidable obstacles in the abolition of needle prescrip-
tion laws.332 For example, Republican Governor Pete Wilson has three 
times vetoed legislation allowing for needle exchange programs in 
California.333 In states where the legislature does allow for such pro-
grams, Republican legislators have moved to tighten control over such 
programs.334 For example, the tendencies of the legislatures, as evi-
denced by Massachusetts and Connecticut, is to create narrowly tai-
lored exceptions to needle prescription laws.335 By creating exceptions 
326 See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (1993); Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
327 See People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d 507 (1991). 
328 See CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL No. 547, 1995 Regular Session; Committee Report for 1995 
California Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular Session. 
329 See supra part lV, C (discussing the current status of needle exchange programs within 
states that continue to have needle prescription laws). 
330See, e.g., CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4143 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21A-65 
(West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 94C, § 27 (West 1995); Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
331 See Bordowitz, 588 NYS.2d at 507; Needles, supra note 15, at 21. 
332 2/15/94 Inside Report on AIDS, 1994 WL 3169449; Committee Report for 1995 California 
Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular Session; MacPherson, supra note 214, at 1. 
333 Committee Report for 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 1407, 1995-1996 Regular Session. 
334 See CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL No. 547, 1995 Regular Session. 
335Id; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 27 (West 1995). 
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rather than abolishing the laws, legislatures are able to maintain con-
trol over what type of program is allowed (public, private or both) .336 
They are also able to control other aspects of the programs such as the 
number of needles exchanged, the age group, and the treatment plan 
of the participants.337 
Senator Kissel of Connecticut attempted to maintain strict control 
over the exception in Connecticut legislation allowing for publicly state 
sponsored programs.338 He proposed to limit the age group of those 
participants and demanded that clients of the program be enrolled in 
drug treatment-two aspects which were attempted in the failed 1989 
New York pilot program.33g However, despite valuable lessons to be 
learned from the New York program, it appears that legislatures, such 
as Connecticut's, are opting for exceptions rather than abolition to 
needle prescription laws.34o If Republicans are successful in continuing 
to structure needle exchange programs, the number of participants 
excluded will most likely increase and hurt successful programs such 
as New Haven.341 
However, a positive result of legislators placing restrictions on 
exceptions to needle exchange programs is that it may force more 
states to attempt to use their police power.342 Furthermore, it may also 
have the effect of forcing more AIDS activists into courts to debilitate 
the effect of needle prescription laws via the use of the necessity 
defense.343 
If state legislatures refuse to abolish needle prescription laws and 
further restrict the structure of state needle exchange programs as has 
been the recent movement in states such as Massachusetts and Con-
necticut, counties within these states may opt for programs such as 
those in California.344 Due to the inability to create viable needle 
336 See CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL No. 547, 1995 Regular Session; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
94C, § 21-65 (West 1995). 
337 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417 § 21A-65 (West 1995); CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL 
No. 547, 1995 Regular Session. 
338 See supra text accompanying note 234-238 (discussing Senator Kissell's proposal to the 
Connecticut statute). 
339 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 80-92 (discussing of New York's experimental 
needle exchange program). 
340 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417 § 21A-65 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 94C 
§ 27 (West 1995). 
341 See CONNECTICUT SENATE BILL No. 547, 1995 Regular Session; Gostin, supra note 2, at 
153, 160. 
342 See Needles, supra note 16, at 2l. 
343 See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 457 (1993); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d 
507,513 (1991). 
344 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C § 27 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 417 
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exchange programs through legislation, California counties created 
their own programs free from legislative structure through their police 
power.345 By identifYing AIDS as a health care crisis and declaring states 
of emergency, counties such as Sacramento, Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco have successfully bypassed state law prohibiting needle ex-
change programs altogether.346 
However, should states such as Massachusetts and Connecticut 
follow the lead of California, it may force the courts to make a decision 
on whether the use of police power for the purpose of establishing 
needle exchange programs is in fact justifiable.347 So far, California 
courts have yet to endorse or condemn the use of such power. 348 
However, if other states follow suit, this may push the issue back into 
the courts where decisions in other states regarding needle exchange 
programs have been mixed.349 
2. Judicial Tendencies 
The judicial level appears to be the best hope for needle exchange 
advocates in gaining approval for such programs through the use of 
the necessity defense.350This allows for another option at the state level 
namely for AIDS activists to operate their own programs independent 
from legislative structure and continue to challenge their validity un-
der the defense of necessity.351 How the courts will view this defense is 
uncertain because it is presently mixed among the states.352 Activists in 
New York have been successful in arguing that distributing clean nee-
dles is a warranted action in response to the AIDS crisis.353 
The defense as exemplified in the Massachusetts case Common-
wealth v. Leno, is not always accepted.354 In fact, the court in Leno viewed 
the defendants' claim of fighting AIDS as debatable and speculative.355 
Since the Leno decision, however, studies by the University of California 
§ 21A-65 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 368A § 19A-124 (West 1995); Needles, supra 
note 16, at 21. 
345 Needles, supra note 16, at 21. 
346 See id. 
347 [d. at 22. 
348 [d. 
349 See id; Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (1993); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d 
507 (1991). 
350 See Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d at 507. 
351 See Leno, 616 N.E.2d at 453; Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d at 507. 
352 See Leno, 616 N.E.2d at 453; Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d at 507. 
353 Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d at 511. 
354 See Leno, 616 N.E.2d at 456. 
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and Centers for Disease Control have produced findings that needle 
exchange programs are effective.356 This may have a positive impact on 
how courts decide cases that invoke the defense of necessity.357 These 
studies may cause courts to abandon previously held suspicions.358 
However, even if courts do take these studies into account, they 
may still refuse to accept the defense of necessity.359 Another reason 
the court in Leno refused the defense is that they believed it did not 
provide for use when the danger is not imminent.36o They believed any 
restructuring of the defense was the responsibility of the legislature 
and not the courts.361 Therefore, courts in other states may follow the 
logic of the Leno court and again defer decisions until the legislatures 
can restructure the defense of necessity.362 Hopefully, courts that review 
the studies' findings will follow the decision in Bordowitz, which viewed 
AIDS as a real and imminent threat to the public and allowed the 
defense of necessity regardless of the legislative action.363 This would al-
low activists to conduct private programs free from legislative controp64 
B. How Minorities Will Impact the Future of Needle Exchange Programs 
Although the recent studies may have an impact upon state legis-
latures and courts when addressing needle exchange programs, they 
could also have a similar effect upon minority leaders and citizens 
within the inner city.365 The current movement within inner city com-
munities has been to tentatively accept needle exchange programs.366 
Furthermore, studies' results illustrating needle exchange programs' 
success in lowering the spread of HIV while not increasing drug abuse, 
may help solidify this acceptance.367 Tentative acceptance is based on 
356Coburn, supra note 312, at 7; Russell, supra note 213, at 1. 
357 See Coburn, supra note 312, at 7; Russell, supra note 213, at 1. 
358 See Leno, 616 N.E.2d at 456-57; Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d at 512; Coburn, supra note 312, 
at 7; Russell, supra note 213, at 1. 
359 See Leno, 616 N.E.2d at 453. 
360 Id. at 456. 
361Id. at 456-57. 
362 See id. Chief Justice Liacos in concurrence stated that he wished the expert evidence pre-
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tions that have decriminalized possession and distribution of hypodermic syringes. Id. at 457. 
363 See Bordowitz, 588 N.YS.2d at 512. 
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public approval of such programs by black mayors and a decrease in 
opposition from religious and community leaders.368 Proponents of 
needle exchange programs, however, need to understand the concerns 
of black Americans and garner the support of minority politicians and 
citizens.369 The fears of minorities regarding drugs and AIDS must be 
acknowledged and addressed.370 Overall, it appears that in many urban 
areas, minority leaders such as Reverend Ellis-Hagler have become less 
adament in their opposition to such programs.371 
Opposition from the minority community comes largely from the 
Nation of Islam and its charismatic leader Louis Farrakhan.372 Due to 
the success of the Million Man March and its publicity, Farrakhan must 
be recognized as a possible threat to needle exchange programs.373 If 
Farrakhan and other leaders in the Nation ofIslam continue to spread 
the message to blacks that AIDS is genocide and needle exchanges 
exist to perpetuate drug dependency within the inner cities, it could 
lead to a minority backlash.374 This could produce similar results to 
1990, where in New York, the needle exchange program was abolished 
as a result of minority opposition within the community in which the 
program is placed.375 It has been suggested that sponsors of the needle 
exchange programs communicate with both the black community and 
civil rights leaders in order to dispel myths regarding AIDS, drugs, and 
needle exchange.376 While this action is necessary, it is questionable 
whether Farrakhan would be willing to cooperate with needle ex-
change programs to send such a message.377 Programs will likely have 
greater success by communicating with black leaders, such as Magic 
Johnson, as well as prominent black mayors, and having them act as 
spokesmen within the inner cities to help continue the trend toward 
acceptance of such programs.378 The influence of prominent black 
368 Kirp & Bayer, supra note 6, at 89; Thomas & Crouse Quinn, supra note 18, at 115. 
369 See Dalton, supra note 19, at 222, 224; Johnson, supra note 311, at 7. 
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leaders on the inner city could also help combat any negative effect 
Farrakhan's message could have upon such programs.379 
C. Federal Level: AIDS Activists v. Republican Congress and 
Democrat Bill Clinton 
Unfortunately, the least progress in acceptance of needle exchange 
programs has apparently been at the federal level of our government.380 
After twelve years of a Republican White House, AIDS activists may 
have put too much hope in the election of Bill Clinton.381 Although 
President Clinton addresses AIDS more openly than Presidents Reagan 
and Bush did, he appears reluctant to propose necessary federal fund-
ing for needle exchange programs for fear of a Republican backlash.382 
Although programs over the last ten years have been able to survive 
without such funding, it is necessary for the President and other 
national leaders to acknowledge the success of such programs in order 
to strengthen their legitimacy at the state leveP83 Despite recent stud-
ies, the Clinton administration has treated needle exchange programs 
as a political hot potato.384 
In the legislative branch, needle exchange programs have been 
neglected by a Republican Congress.38.5 The statute Congress passed in 
1988 regarding the funding of needle exchange programs was condi-
tional. 386 The statute stated that no federal funds would be designated, 
unless the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service determined 
the efficacy of such programs in reducing drug abuse and the risk of 
contracting AIDS.387 The results of studies by the University of Califor-
nia at San Francisco and The Centers for Disease Control have proven 
that needle exchange programs do not increase drug abuse, are an 
effective link to treatment, and reduce the risk of contracting AIDS.388 
Despite these findings, Congress, led by the charge of Republican 
379 See Dalton, supra note 19. at 224; Whitman, supra note 149, at 1. 
380 See Russell, supra note 213, at 1; ADAMHA, supra note 309, at 1; Aid for AIDS, supra note 
33, at 1. 
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Senator Jesse Helms, has refused to give any funding to needle ex-
change programs.3S9 It is possible studies will never be able to conclu-
sively prove that needle exchange programs help to combat drugs, 
however, that is not their main goal. 390 They achieve their goal of 
seeking to reduce the spread of HIV among IDUs. As a result they 
deserve recognition and funding. 391 
With the presidential election approaching, it appears that this 
issue will be neglected again by the Clinton Administration for fear of 
Republican retaliation during the campaign.392 Based on President 
Clinton's past reticence, federal funding seems doubtful for at least the 
next year.393 The next four years could prove to be equally disappoint-
ing if we maintain a Republican Congress and a Democratic President 
willing to acquiesce to Congress' wishes regarding needle exchange 
programs.394 Without federal funding in the upcoming years, needle 
exchange programs could be in jeopardy as a result of legislative and 
judicial challenges.395 Overall, apathy on the part of both Congress and 
the Clinton Administration have evidenced that needle exchange pro-
gram dispute has become nothing more than a political football game 
with no winners.396 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The best chance needle exchange programs have for survival is 
an interaction between various community groups and branches of 
government that will reinforce the vitality and acceptance of the pro-
grams.397 If state legislatures are unwilling to abolish needle prescrip-
tion laws, they need to allow public needle exchange programs to exist 
without interference.398 Legislators must rely on the expertise of health 
care workers and AIDS activists for program structure rather than 
placing detrimental restrictions on the programs themselves. 
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AIDS activists must not demand separate private needle exchange 
programs in addition to with public needle exchange programs.399 If 
such cooperation could take place at the state level, the court system 
would not be required to decide if the necessity defense is applicable.40o 
Ideally, all programs would be sanctioned by state legislatures.401 
State needle exchange programs require full support from both 
AIDS activists and minority leaders.402 Minority leaders must continue 
to challenge community distrust of government programs, so that state 
needle exchange programs can affect those who need them most-in-
ner city minority citizens.403 
Finally, if state needle exchange programs are to survive they need 
more than support from legislatures, AIDS activists, and minority lead-
ers-they need the endorsement of the federal government.404 It is vital 
that the federal government fulfill its promise to provide federal fund-
ing to needle exchange programs if they are proven successful.405 Inter-
action among these players will result in the stability and uniformity of 
needle exchange programs. This is necessary in order for the programs 
to be productive and successful. 
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